Warfighting – Week 6

EXPEDITIONARY MANEUVER WARFARE DISCUSSION FACULTY SPOOL GUIDE

Concepts must provide a consistent, clearly articulated, and logical bridge between public laws, joint documents, and the Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 series and the capabilities required to execute it. Concepts will, therefore, spread from the top down. The goal of Marine Corps Concepts is to provide a roadmap for the evolution of the Marine Corps. These concepts must ensure unity of effort within the service. Concepts must clearly articulate the vision of our leadership and effectively guide our progress toward that vision. Their purpose is to optimize the capability and versatility of the Marine Corps of the future, rather than merely correct the deficiencies of the past.

—Extract from Concepts Division Mission Statement

1. Concepts-based Requirements Process

It is important to understand why the Marine Corps and other services have shifted to a concepts-based requirements process. It is a logical flow of defining how we need to man, equip, train, and fight to meet the nation's needs in the *future* as an institution. A review of historical advantages and disadvantages are relevant only to that historical era. Concepts enable an organization to *project* its relevance into a dynamic environment that takes into consideration historical issues but defines those capabilities against a projected operational environment and analyzed threat(s). Then deficiencies can be discerned by scrutinizing capabilities required in the future and comparing them to present capabilities, not to deficiencies or successes defined by our last conflict or engagement. Thus, concepts drive future changes not only to future equipment needs, an often myopic focus of concepts review, but also to changes in doctrine, training, organization, and the means and ways we support those functions.

2. References

- Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare pamphlet
- Concepts & Issues 2001, "Forging the Future Corps"
- MCDP 1-0

3. Issues for Consideration

a. What is the EMW concept?

EMW is the Marine Corps' capstone concept for the 21st century. It is built on our core competencies and prepares the Marine Corps, as a "total force," to meet the challenges and opportunities of a rapidly changing world. Capitalizing on our maneuver warfare philosophy and expeditionary heritage, the concept contains the enduring characteristics and evolving capabilities, upon which the Marine Corps will rely, to promote peace and stability and mitigate or resolve crises as part of a joint force. EMW focuses Marine Corps competencies, evolving capabilities, and innovative concepts to ensure that we provide the JFC with forces optimized for forward presence, engagement, crisis response, antiterrorism, and warfighting.

EMW is the Corps' answer to yesterday's, today's, and tomorrow's method of adapting and staying relevant as the nation's choice for an expeditionary force. We will train and be prepared to be a small or large force at any given moment. We will maximize joint assets to get us into theater by maintaining a high level of flexibility. We will do all this at a moment's notice. Bottom line, EMW relies heavily on joint operations to ensure that the proper force structure, fires, and logistics all arrive at the right time and place (ultimately as close to the objective area as possible), circumventing a need for a forced beachhead.

b. Define the term "capstone concept" when discussing EMW.

Page A-3 of the EMW pamphlet reflects the foundation on which the EMW "Capstone" rests. Use this diagram as you discuss this issue.



c. What are the key focus points of EMW?

i. *Joint/Multinational Enabling*: This includes enabling operations, which constitute actions such as establishing C2 capable of a JTF headquarters, seizing forward-operating bases, defeating enemy access capabilities, and exploiting through use of Marine assets as an operational maneuver element.
ii. *Strategic Agility*: The ability to transition from pre-crisis to full operational capability through multiple deployment methods.
iii. *Operational Reach*: The ability to project power in depth in the theater of operations from a sea- or land-based posture.
iv. *Tactical Flexibility*: The ability to conduct multiple, concurrent, and multidimensional capabilities such as simultaneous raids, NEOs, and counter-terrorism as well as amphibious operations.
v. *Support and Sustainment*: The ability to show up at the theater of operations as self-sustaining MAGTFs—"a full up round" upon arrival.

d. What are the five types of MAGTFs that EMW envisions deploying to meet the full spectrum of our institutional responsibilities?

i. *MEU(SOC)*: Designed for forward presence.
ii. *MEB*: Designed as the preferred mid-intensity MAGTF of choice.

iii. *MEF*: Employed to meet the demands of major regional contingencies.
iv. *SPMAGTF*: Organized as required by mission, it may not contain all of the traditional elements of the MAGTF (i.e., CE, GCE, CSE, ACE).
v. *4th MEB (AT)*: Newest among the MAGTF organizations, trained to respond rapidly to worldwide terrorist threats and actual terrorist attacks.

e. What are the tenets of EMW?

i. Focus on decision-making and effects on an operational objective.
ii. Maximize maneuver battlespace (air, land, and sea) through enhanced mobility.
iii. Generate overwhelming tempo and momentum through enhanced strategic agility, operational reach, and tactical flexibility.
iv. Pit strength against enemy weakness.
v. Emphasize intelligence, deception, flexibility, and sustainability.
vi. Promote integration of organic, joint, inter-agency, and combined effects.
vii. Provide capabilities across the entire spectrum of operations. (The single most important tenet—written to dispel accusations that the Corps focuses myopically on "Saving Private Ryan" operational issues)

f. What is Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS)? Is it a concept or a capability? Is it maneuver warfare from the sea or something more?

OMFTS is a warfighting concept. Its focus is on the application of the operational art to amphibious operations of the 21st century. The idea of projecting power ashore from a naval force is several millennia old. What is new is the means of countries, even developing countries, to stymie an amphibious assault. The methods and means provide a logical, and arguably, evolutionary improvement to old amphibious doctrine by extending the battlespace. This extension of the amphibious battlespace and the means to accomplish this enhancement improve force protection of the amphibious task force, provide improved tactical surprise, and significantly improve operational dexterity in the selection and application of force within the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

What does OMFTS enable the MAGTF to do?

- Shatter the enemy's cohesion
- Pose menacing dilemmas
- Apply disruptive firepower
- Establish superior tempo
- Focus efforts to maximize effect
- Exploit opportunity
- Strike unexpectedly

In OMFTS, the force focuses on an operational objective, using the sea as maneuver space to generate overwhelming tempo and momentum against enemy critical vulnerabilities. OMFTS provides increased operational flexibility through enhanced capabilities for sea-based logistics, fires, and command and control. Sea-basing facilitates maneuver warfare by eliminating the requirement for an operational pause as the landing force builds combat power ashore, and by freeing the MAGTF from the constraints of a traditional beachhead.
What new technologies is the Marine Corps employing to make OMFTS a reality?

- Advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV)
- MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft
- Joint Strike Fighter
- Developing command and control systems (e.g., STAR-T, CAC2S)
- Light Strike Craft (LSC)

What do these emerging technologies provide the Marine Corps?

Landing force units will possess their own mobility systems—and have the ability to navigate independently across the ocean surface to penetrate the enemy's shoreline at points of their choosing. Freed from the constraints of securing a large beachhead, the commander will be able to focus on the enemy and begin the landing force's maneuver from over the horizon. These new capabilities will enable tactical commanders to make decisions as the situation develops in order to exploit enemy weaknesses and maintain the momentum of the attack from the ship to the objective.

g. If MEBs are the force of choice to conduct forcible entry, what are the lift requirements for a MEB responding to a crisis? Discuss the impact amphibious lift will have on our ability to get forces to the fight and to logistically support assault forces from the sea. Will the MEB be able to sustain itself?

Our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy require that the U.S. military be capable of forward deploying, projecting power ashore, and sustaining that force, once committed, with the strategic and operational capability to either withdraw or reinforce that force, once committed. We require a forcible entry capability; one aspect in support of forcible entry may in fact be shaping operations that include raids. The lift requirement for a MEB assault echelon is 18 ships. We do not have those ships in our active-duty military inventory anymore. Each coast can source no more than a committed MEU and 14 ships in support of a MEB's assault echelon (AE). The AE must have a complementary assault follow-on echelon (AFOE) and follow-on shipping to deliver the remaining required combat power and provide long-term sustainment. Until MPF(F) and other concepts come to fruition, the AE will also require the initial ATF/LF objective to include ports and airfields—a significant constraint that OMFTS envisions alleviating given the means (e.g., at sea replenishment, reconfiguration, and full-capability, sea-based logistics).

h. What challenges are associated with a doctrinal ship-to-shore landing against a modern, integrated coastal defense? Are landing operations from over the horizon (OTH) the answer to meet modern coastal threats? If so, how will we be able to get surface forces ashore with today's equipment? How will ship-to-objective maneuver from over the horizon complicate sustainability?

i. The 25nms OTH standoff was a systems compromise between the conceptual developers and the requirements advocates when OMFTS was drafted. It was the practical distance where both visually and cued anti-landing systems and surface radar were appreciably degraded to a point where we could improve force protection but still conduct ship-to-shore movement with current and planned systems (e.g., AAAV/MV-22).

ii. Coastal defense systems comfortably reach into and beyond the 25nm standoff range envisioned in the concept—we will never, nor have we ever had, a benign environment in which to conduct an amphibious assault. OTH does provide enough stand-off that interception, detection, and counter-fires are all appreciably enhanced.

iii. Sustainment at OTH ranges is the real key (assuming we can solve the mine problem). Newer amphibs and MPF(F) must have the capacity for at-sea reconfiguration, selective off-load, and "universal space" when surging maintenance for rolling stock or aviation systems and make those different requirements transparent to the ship's basic functions.

i. What role will the MV-22 and the advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV) play in OMFTS? Are these two platforms the answer for Marine forces to successfully conduct OMFTS? Evaluate their capabilities to deliver combined-arms teams at the decisive point. Use the warfighting functions (maneuver, fires, logistics, C2, intel, and force protection) in your analysis.

The bottom line is this: programmatically, our wagon is hitched to these two horses. For more reasons than can be discussed in an hour, we need to embrace these systems but we also should understand their limitations clearly and begin, even before they are fully fielded, discovering ways to mask their weaknesses. I'll assume you and the students have a working knowledge of the advertised capabilities of these systems. Here are a few worth considering:

i. The AAAV needs 15 feet of water (i.e., the depth of water required to "fold" planning chines) to transition from planning mode (25nmph) to transport mode (10nmph). In the Persian Gulf, the 15-foot water depth line is, in some places, 3km from the high-water mark. This factor puts the AAAV at the same relative delivery (speed of approach) the AAV has in a shallow-water environment (AAV is doctrinally launched between 3 and 5km from the beach and moves at 8 knots).

ii. The AAAV will not have a C2 version in which occupants can talk to each other if the intercom fails. They will all sit around the engine cowling with only limited visual contact with the two adjacent workstations.

iii. The MV-22 is not designed to carry internal vehicles. Some work-arounds are in progress but the interim fast attack vehicle is a Band-aid. Its ability to lift externally limits its speed to that of a CH-53.

iv. The MV-22 has very limited on-board enplaned troop communications support and no windows. Enplaned personnel will be entirely reliant on the aircraft crew for situational awareness between lift and landing points.

v. The MV-22 will not carry the LW155 externally. It wasn't designed to do so, although the numbers initially matched and it was a nice advertisement…. Once the LW155 becomes digitally compatible with the Advanced Field Artillery Technical Data System (AFATDS), it will no longer likely be air transportable for any tactically significant distance by the MV-22 (e.g., comm suite and automated firing system are projected to put it outside of the routine external envelope for MV-22 as an external [10+k]).

j. How do the tenets of sea-based logistics change how we have historically operated from what OMFTS espouses? How does it change the standing tradition of self-sustaining naval forces? What are the possibilities and challenges associated with sea-based logistics?

Two large differences from present doctrine exist. First, the ships stay. They are part of our warfighting capabilities. They are now armored personnel carriers, and they have C2, provide mobility and sustainment, and have a selective off-load capacity; they are not buses. Second, 24-hour operational capability may be essential. That may mean half the FSSG gets secondary MOSs in sailor duties to man-afloat stations—*their* expeditionary skills will be set to sustain the landing force versus to come ashore. The general off-load will become an option, not part of the historical dump-ex conducted after scheduled waves have completed. "Newer amphibs and MPF(F) must have the capacity for at-sea reconfiguration, selective off-load, and "universal space" where surging maintenance for rolling stock or aviation systems is transparent to the ship's functions."

k. How do EMW and OMFTS affect our current doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)? What are the functional area implications that need to be considered and resolved? What are the differences from today's capabilities?

i. **Command and Control**

(a) Afloat; integrated with the Navy and the JTF commander; expandable (MEU→MEB→MEF) and upgradeable.
(b) Dedicated spaces; ships stay, and we fight with the Navy. LH-class ships will not support a full MEB-sized operation—topside real estate is limited in bandwidth growth. LCCs are going away, and JCCX is in question; many Marine Corps senior officers believe we will never conduct another large-scale amphibious landing, OMFTS style or otherwise. However, we have a mandate to be able to conduct such an operation, and we need the C2 nodes, spaces, and infrastructure to support it *if* required.

ii. **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance**
This area includes response, decentralized dissemination, shipboard EW capabilities (SESS spaces for blue and green). Train to make the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) a true all-source fusion center for afloat force.

iii. **Logistics**
Logistics is covered in detail in the last question. Well-planned logistics ensures we remain responsive, afloat, and able to push logistics ashore and conduct a dedicated build-up during periods in which weather (WX) will predictably shut down both surface and air means of delivery. Sailors plan for three days out of 10 as no-fly, no-float days. We should, too. How much rolling stock does it take to combat load three DOA/DOS for a MEB (I, III, V)? We can do it, but it's ugly.

iv. **Fires**
To preclude the pause required to get artillery fully ashore and fire cap, we must have an at-sea, all-weather VOLUME and suppressive fires capability to complement the precision munitions focused on today.

v. **Maneuver**
Expanded depth and breadth of battlefield has inherent risk. It also brings about expanded opportunities for exploitation. We must train and empower commanders at all levels to recognize those opportunities and exploit them.

vi. **Force Protection**
The underlying theme of EMW and OMFTS is to put the fewest people possible directly in harm's way to do the job. Don't drive the ship into the beach; fight from the ship directly to objectives. Don't put the truck mechanic ashore and split his 18-hour workday between turning a wrench and standing guard or conducting a security patrol. Don't put the extra cook ashore when he can cook and we can deliver rations from the ship. There are numerous examples.